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Armenia is experiencing an unprecedented transformative process, which is now consolidated by Nikol Pashinyan's third electoral victory. It is true that he no longer enjoys the impressive backing he had when the phenomenon first emerged, when he obtained 70% of the vote, but last weekend's nearly 50%—more than double that of his main rival—indicates that this South Caucasus republic has definitively changed its course. Much to Russia's chagrin. Moscow tried all kinds of ruses to weaken the government led by the Armenian Prime Minister: from import blockades (on mineral water, cognac, beer, fish, fruit) to threats from President Vladimir Putin. "The crisis in Ukraine began with its attempts to join the European Union," the Kremlin leader declared last month. But it was not enough.
In 2025, the Armenian Parliament approved the start of negotiations on joining the European Union, and Pashinyan recently stated that his country wants, "unequivocally and unquestioningly," to join the bloc, even though no formal application has yet been made. Local regulations stipulate that a referendum should be held to delegate powers to a supranational organization, but Pashinyan argues that this will not be necessary until there is concrete progress in the process and in the structural reforms that the bloc will request. In this sense, the June 7 elections were a sort of de facto referendum: not only for Pashinyan's continuity in power, but also for the international orientation between Russia and Europe. The results speak for themselves.
However, this transition will not be easy because Armenia used to be a staunch ally of Moscow. It is a member of all the international organizations promoted by the Kremlin, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which it joined after rejecting an Association Agreement with the UE; the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance that, like NATO, obliges all its members to respond if one of them is attacked. In 2013, Pashinyan voted against joining the EAEU, arguing that it would affect the international orientation of complementarity between Europe and Russia, as well as its relations with Iran. And in 2023, after canceling a series of joint military exercises, he said it had been a mistake to rely on Russia as a guarantor of Armenia's security; a few months later, he froze his country's participation in the CSTO.
In commercial terms, Russia accounts for more than a third of Armenia's foreign trade, comfortably surpassing China (12.5%) and the EU (11.8%). Furthermore, Moscow supplies 85% of Armenia's gas, manages its distribution throughout the country, and also controls rail transport, the main electricity generators, a large part of telecommunications, and some of the largest mining companies. As if that were not enough, it possesses a military base with nearly three thousand soldiers and authorization to remain on the territory until 2044. In other words, Russia does not lack political, commercial, or even military leverage to put a small, landlocked country like Armenia, with few resources, in check. This is why Pashinyan's victory is particularly significant.
The risk is great, and Armenia cannot definitively cut ties with Russia without replacing them first. The commercial and political rapprochement with the EU and China are steps on a long road, but the most complex factor is represented by two of its four neighbors. Armenia has had closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war (1988-1994), in which control over a territory internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, but predominantly inhabited by Armenians, was disputed. The latter won, and Azerbaijan would only manage to recover the area in 2023, following its victory in the second war (2020) and the expulsion of local inhabitants. That war was what triggered the change of course for Armenia: Russia did not back it either politically or militarily.
It is logical that a large portion of Armenians want nothing to do with signing peace and re-establishing formal relations with their enemies. But it is also true that Armenia has no major alternatives. Pashinyan proposes moving toward opening borders, which would allow exporting to new markets and, above all, becoming a logistics hub between Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkey—between Asia and Europe—something that would be particularly profitable regarding the hydrocarbon trade.
In addition to the Civil Contract, led by the Prime Minister, two other parties managed to clear the minimum threshold and won seats in Parliament. On one hand, Strong Armenia, a new party founded by Samvel Karapetyan, the country's richest man, who made his fortune in Russia during the 1990s, like so many other oligarchs. The businessman recently renounced his Russian citizenship and promised to forge closer relations with Moscow. His party came in second place with 23% of the vote.
On the other hand, the Armenia Alliance, led by Robert Kocharyan, president between 1998 and 2008, and a prominent figure during the first Nagorno-Karabakh war. His presence recalls that victory, nationalism, and the strength of the military world, but also a period of corruption, low democratic standards, authoritarian practices, and the extensive informal control of a handful of oligarchs: a scenario all too similar to that of other former Soviet republics. In 2021, he had obtained 21% in the snap elections called after the military defeat. This time, no longer having the argument of recovering military might and advancing over lost territory, he fell to third place with less than 10%.
The process led by the Prime Minister implies a transformation that goes beyond proximity to the EU or distance from Russia. Losing the 2020 war and sidelining the Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh, surrendering the territory and letting go of the possibility of recovering it, is a very harsh blow to national identity. Turning the page almost with diplomatic nonchalance does not come without a cost. And yet, it was backed in 2021 and once again last weekend. The results mark a political and commercial shift, yes, but also a change in mindset, in the collective unconscious. There is a new generation of Armenians more concerned with day-to-day life than with nationalist rhetoric; more interested in democracy, ending corruption, or improving wages than in going to war once again.
Pashinyan might have been seen as a political outsider just under a decade ago. He was a member of a newly founded, small party that managed to secure 9 seats in Parliament thanks to a moderately pro-European discourse, moderately critical of Russia, but enough to catch the attention of Armenians. Then came the 2018 revolution and, with it, the fall from grace of the "Old Guard," those strongmen linked to the military world and enthroned thanks to the 1994 wartime victory. Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, the leaders who had driven the strengthening of ties with Moscow, were defeated by tens of thousands of demonstrators led by an almost unknown Pashinyan and his megaphone. Eight years, a harsh military defeat at the hands of Azerbaijan, and three elections later, that former outsider remains a central figure.
From now on, there are two doubts that Pashinyan must resolve. On one hand, whether he can deliver on his most concrete promises: if there are real chances of joining the European Union, if Armenia can meet all the requirements demanded by the bloc, if the Prime Minister can convince his citizens to back him in peace negotiations with Azerbaijan and in the constitutional changes demanded by his (former?) enemy, and if potential new markets will suffice to replace Russia. And, on the other hand, whether so much power and backing will go to his head. He would not be the first in the same region to arrive with promises of change and slowly turn into an increasingly authoritarian figure.
