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Viktor Orbán’s 16-year tenure at the helm of Hungary marked a period of profound transformation for the country—an era in which the apparent pro-Western social consensus was shattered and democracy itself was put at risk. The governance, institutional stability, and political participation indices for this Central European nation fell steadily, turning it into the European Union’s most defiant member; the same one the European Parliament accused of posing a "clear risk of a serious breach" of the values championed by the continental bloc.
Yet, the leader who once seemed invincible could not break everything and was forced to concede defeat on April 12. The incoming Prime Minister, Péter Magyar, is a former member of Orbán’s party and now leads an organization that, ideologically, shares many commonalities with that of the outgoing leader. Magyar faces two monumental challenges: first, representing the diverse electorate that supported him solely for being the opposition candidate with the best odds and, second, rebuilding what remains of Hungarian democracy.
The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) monitors the institutional pulse of 137 countries every two years. To do so, it utilizes 17 indicators divided into three dimensions: governance quality, economic performance, and the health of the political system. Its reports identify whether a country is strengthening its democratic foundations or, conversely, sliding toward authoritarianism. The latest BTI, published in March, helps to quantify just how steep the decline of Hungary’s indices has been during Orbán’s mandate: in 2008, two years before the change of government, the local "status of democracy" exceeded 9.3 points out of 10, and the economic status stood at 9 points. By 2026, these have fallen to 6.2 and 6.75, respectively. Meanwhile, the governance index dropped from 6.9 to 3.4. When all indicators are aggregated, Hungary fell from 8th to 34th place globally, ranking last within the European bloc. This debacle underscores how improbable a victory was for an opposition that has been increasingly restricted.
From Hope to Disappointment
Orbán was a recently graduated young lawyer when, in 1988, he founded the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz, by its Hungarian acronym), a political group that sought to compete with the Communist Youth League. A year later, at a massive event in the Hungarian capital, he demanded free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from his country. This background paved his way to power in 1998, in the midst of a complex transition period following the fall of communism, dominated by corruption and poverty. He was a new liberal leader, a democrat, and a symbol of change who had never made deals with the heirs of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, which had ruled until 1989. However, just four years later, Orbán lost the elections and was defeated once again in 2006.
His time in the opposition was marked by constant blockades that negatively impacted Hungary’s economic development and by challenges to both the government’s democratic legitimacy and the political system as a whole. The 2008 economic crisis allowed him to consolidate popular discontent, and by 2010, he realized he needed to change his discourse and strategy to defeat the left-wing coalition led by the socialists. He transformed from a symbol of liberal democracy into the voice of nationalism, securing—alongside his junior partners in the Christian Democratic People’s Party—a supermajority: two-thirds of the seats in Parliament, enough to amend the most relevant laws and the national Constitution itself. In 2011, he overhauled the Fundamental Law in just a few days behind closed doors, amending the text twelve times before his first anniversary in power.
What followed were 16 years of restrictions on democratic competition, increasing advantages for the ruling party through the allocation of public resources to political cronies, and a lack of independent oversight. Slowly, Fidesz took over all types of institutions, de facto eliminating the autonomy of the judicial system, state media, and national banking entities.
Orbán’s primary strategy to divert public attention from his continuous march toward autocracy consisted of two populist narrative tactics: victimization and the creation of enemies. For the former, he turned to historical aspects, such as the Treaty of Trianon, which in 1920, following the end of the World War, saw a defeated Hungary lose two-thirds of its territory and half of its population. Repeatedly invoking this event helped consolidate the idea of a cheated nation that has historically suffered from being surrounded by different—and potentially dangerous—peoples (Slavic, Germanic, Latin). But it also served to evade historical responsibility for the crimes committed by Miklós Horthy, the leader of Hungary from 1920 through World War II and a Nazi ally. Orbán has repeatedly referred to Horthy, suggesting an ideological and symbolic affinity between the two.
The second strategy, the creation of enemies, varied over time but always maintained inflammatory rhetoric filled with hate and polarizing violence: "them against us"; white, Christian Hungarian nationalism against foreign interests. First, it was the communists and their successor parties; then the primary enemy became investor and philanthropist George Soros (who, it should be noted, is Jewish); followed by LGBTQ+ groups, the European Union, civil society organizations, refugees (mostly Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi Muslims) seeking asylum during the 2015 migration crisis, and finally, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. As the latest BTI points out, the government repeatedly resorted to Christian values to justify its actions.
Fidesz’s efforts to extend political control to nearly all areas of public life also included the politicization of resource allocation, reducing or withholding funds intended for cities governed by the opposition. This, combined with outdated tariffs, also led to a decline in the quality of public services and a significant brain drain, especially in the healthcare sector.
Unequal Democracy
Government control of public media and restrictions during electoral campaigns created a situation of inequality against opposition parties, while the election oversight body, influenced by the government, was not always impartial. To make matters worse, the 2011 constitutional reform and the new electoral law of the same year reduced the number of Members of Parliament, redrew districts to concentrate the opposition vote in a few areas while dispersing the pro-government vote, and abolished the second round, thus favoring the largest party and punishing the fragmentation of other forces. Furthermore, "winner-take-all" surplus votes were added to the winner’s national list, allowing them to transform a broad victory in one district into even more proportional seats. This led to Fidesz securing two-thirds of the seats again in 2014, even though it obtained fewer votes than in 2010: just 44.8%. The broad reach of clientelism, especially in the periods leading up to elections, further consolidated this trend.
The weakening of institutions led to a 2024 Pew Research Center survey showing that 51% of Hungarians were dissatisfied with the democratic system, and according to the 2024 Ipsos Global Trustworthiness Index, 70% of respondents expressed distrust in politicians. This debacle was also reflected in successive BTI reports: political participation fell from 10 to 6.3 points over the last 16 years, while the rule of law and institutional stability both dropped from 9 to 5.
Farther from the EU, Closer to Russia
In 2014, Orbán defined the model he aspired to as an "illiberal democracy" and its counterpart, liberal democracy, as corrupt and unfair. He then referred to Singapore, Russia, Turkey, and China as "economically successful" States, even though they were not liberal or even democracies. Since then, he promoted greater exchanges with ideologically similar countries that allowed him to maintain a degree of autonomy within the European Union, rhetorically confronting the bloc without abandoning it.
At the beginning of his administration, he announced a foreign policy strategy called "Opening to the East" (Keleti Nyitás), which involved deepening economic and political cooperation with the Organization of Turkic States, particularly with Turkey and Azerbaijan—two other highly undemocratic states.
Fidesz promoted Chinese investment through the Belt and Road Initiative, driven by Beijing, and accessed loans from that country which, while much smaller than EU funds, offered limited protection against bureaucratic pressure from Brussels and provided an additional, often opaque, source of financing. Regardless, Asia accounted for less than 5% of Hungary’s exports, suggesting these efforts were motivated more by political considerations than underlying economic fundamentals.
Perhaps the most relevant point of Orbán’s foreign policy concerned Russia. Hungary’s dependence on Russian energy sources (oil, gas, and nuclear power) maintained strong political backing, even as trade decreased starting in 2022. Russia still provides technology and personnel for modernization work at the Paks nuclear power plant, which generates nearly half of the country’s electricity. Furthermore, some regulations promoted by Orbán followed Russian government guidelines, such as the 2017 Hungarian legislation on civil society, which hindered the work of independent organizations, or the 2021 anti-LGBTQ+ legislation; both are very similar to laws passed by Russia in 2012 and 2013, respectively. The growing number of Government-Organized NGOs (GONGOs), which appear to represent civil society but are merely an extension of executive power, is another strategy also utilized by the governments of Russia and Azerbaijan.
As with China, this rapprochement responds more to political than economic needs: Russia, unlike the EU, never questioned Orbán’s "illiberal" strategies. In response, Hungary refused to implement commercial sanctions against Moscow promoted by the EU following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, refused to provide weaponry to Kyiv, and even denied the transit of NATO-sent weapons through its territory. Additionally, Orbán blocked the disbursement of European Union funds to Ukraine on various occasions and under all sorts of arguments. The most recent one, used to justify blocking a 90-billion-euro loan in early 2026, was that Kyiv was failing to repair a section of the Druzhba pipeline, through which Hungary imports Russian gas, thereby risking the country’s energy security.
In truth, this was a larger dispute with Brussels—a form of financial extortion—because in April 2022, following Orbán’s latest reelection, the European Commission activated the Conditionality Mechanism for the first time in history, resulting in the suspension of 18 billion euros in cohesion funds. This was because the EU detected that contracts financed with European funds systematically ended up in the hands of a small group of businessmen close to Orbán. The bloc also criticized the lack of judicial independence and the "attack on fundamental European values" at that time.
The now outgoing Hungarian Prime Minister’s argument for not sanctioning Russia was to maintain neutrality: supporting Ukraine would mean getting involved in a war and risking the entire European Union. He also accused Kyiv of undermining the rights of the nearly 150,000 ethnic Hungarians living in western Ukraine, a pretext he used to adopt hostile measures in support of Russian political positions. This resulted in strained relations not only with Brussels and NATO but also with the governments of Ukraine, Poland, Austria, and the Czech Republic.
Even so, Fidesz managed to position itself as a reference for other European parties promoting illiberal democracies, such as President Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party; Slovenia’s former Prime Minister Janez Janša, who has participated in the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Budapest; or the Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, to which former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski belonged—a man wanted by his country’s justice system who has resided in Hungary since 2018. Additionally, despite frequent antisemitic expressions among Fidesz voters, the Prime Minister maintained close ties with Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu.
Crony Economics
The Orbán government confined its economic policies to ideology and cronyism. Nationalist rhetoric translated into pressure on foreign companies to sell their stakes and redistribute assets to oligarchs and Fidesz-affiliated networks, particularly in sectors deemed strategic. According to the BTI, those who refused faced scrutiny from tax authorities and extreme auditing measures. In 2023, a fact-finding mission by the European Parliament denounced the intimidation of foreign companies by the secret police.
Furthermore, although the Fidesz leader formally declared his intention to join the eurozone, efforts to achieve this were limited. Adopting the common currency would have deprived him of a major tool for managing trade imbalances and curtailed his autonomy. Renouncing the national currency would also have contradicted his nationalist discourse. Consequently, Hungary’s monetary and fiscal stability in the BTI fell from 8.5 to 6 points between 2010 and 2026, while respect for private property dropped from 10 to 7.5.
Perspectives
Orbán’s defeat was difficult, but not improbable. After years of political attrition, extreme polarization, violent rhetoric, and growing ties with countries for which Hungarians typically hold little sympathy, all that was needed was for the opposition to unify behind a single candidate. The electoral reforms that once benefited Fidesz this time favored the opposition, which secured 70% of the seats despite obtaining 55% of the vote. The results were so overwhelming that Orbán had no choice but to accept them. Incoming Prime Minister Magyar has already demanded the resignation of the President, whom he does not consider independent despite the constitutional mandate to be so. Almost simultaneously, the European Court of Justice ruled that the 2021 anti-LGBTQ+ law promotes discrimination and violates bloc regulations, ordering its repeal.
It is unlikely that the relationship with Russia will change radically, as the future Prime Minister has shown no interest in stopping the purchase of cheap Russian energy resources. However, it is probable that domestic policies will be modified and some of the measures adopted by Orbán will be rolled back. Even so, the supermajority the new government will hold—and considering Fidesz’s precedents—warrants limited optimism. It is worth remembering that Magyar was a member of Orbán’s party until just two years ago and that many voters supported him solely for being the most viable candidate, not due to ideological affinity. Nevertheless, the deterioration reflected in two decades of BTI indices suggests that, following the departure of the once-all-powerful leader, the country has hit rock bottom and one can only expect improvement.
