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One of the poorest and least developed countries in Europe has just reaffirmed, through elections, a sweeping change of course. Since its independence in 1991, Moldovan politics had swung between pro-Western and pro-Russian parties to such extremes that, in 2001, it became the only former Soviet republic where communism returned to power. But this time the pendulum seems to have broken, and the tug-of-war between Europe and Russia over influence in a troubled country—plagued by recurring economic crises and with part of its territory outside the control of the central government—appears to be reaching its conclusion.
After the mass protests of 2009 that ended Communist rule, a party leaning toward Europe came to power, and in 2016, under heavy commercial pressure from Moscow, Igor Dodon—an admirer of Vladimir Putin who barely speaks Moldovan in public, preferring Russian—assumed the presidency. Just three years later, there was another turn, this time toward Europe: Maia Sandu became Prime Minister, even though her Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) had finished third in the elections. In 2020, Sandu won the presidency, and in 2021 the PAS obtained nearly 53% in parliamentary elections, securing a legislative majority. Never before had a pro-European party governed alone, without the need to form a coalition. This course was reconfirmed with Sandu’s reelection in 2024, as well as by a referendum that, although approved by the razor-thin margin of less than half a percentage point, enshrined EU membership as a constitutional mandate.
Russia never stopped trying to influence Moldovan politics, whether through financing political parties, spreading narratives via Telegram and other social networks, or even sponsoring all-expenses-paid trips for priests who could encourage their congregations to vote for Kremlin-friendly candidates. But it wasn’t enough. On September 28, PAS won over 50% of the vote—the second-best electoral result in Moldova’s history, just behind its own performance in 2021. The pro-Russian bloc, an alliance of socialists and communists led by former president Dodon, came in second once again, but this time further behind than four years earlier: its share fell from 27% to 24%. The logical conclusion might be that the debate is over, that Moldova will join the European Union and Russia will continue losing influence locally, just as happened in Estonia and Lithuania, two former Soviet republics now members of NATO.
This outcome cannot be understood without considering the changes triggered by Russia’s invasion of neighboring Ukraine in 2022. Just months later, in June, Moldova officially became an EU candidate. The West offered incentives that outweighed Russia’s punishments and threats. Not that the Kremlin lacks the capacity to punish those drifting from its sphere of influence—it has demonstrated otherwise in Ukraine, in Georgia, which it invaded in 2008, and in Estonia, where it launched a 2007 cyberattack that disrupted government institutions, banks, and media outlets in one of the first cases of state-sponsored cyberwarfare.
Russia used to be Moldova’s main trade partner, accounting for about 40% of its total trade in 2004. But when a government unfriendly to Moscow took power, sanctions were imposed and trade collapsed. The EU Association Agreement and the establishment of free trade with the bloc deepened a trend that not even Dodon’s rise in 2016 could reverse. By 2021, shortly before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia accounted for barely 10% of Moldovan trade. In response to the 2020 and 2021 elections—two clear pro-Western victories—Moscow resorted to a form of blackmail, cutting gas supplies. The new government responded by diversifying its suppliers, reducing purchases from Moscow by 70% and turning to Azerbaijan and Norway. Sanctions against the Kremlin, combined with Moldova’s lack of a direct border with Russia, further reduced trade after 2022. The result is that, in just 20 years, bilateral trade dropped from 40% to 2%, while trade with the EU rose from 25% in 2004 to 55% in 2024. What would be the point of further commercial sanctions from Putin against a country with which Russia hardly trades anymore?
The military option is another possibility. Transnistria is a strip of land on the other side of the Dniester River that unilaterally declared independence in 1990. Since then, the Moldovan government has not controlled it, although locals may still vote in national elections. High levels of industrialization inherited from the Soviet Union, coupled with Russia’s constant provision of free gas, allowed Transnistria to produce, export, and maintain relatively high living standards—at least compared to the rest of Moldova. Moreover, Moscow secured an enclave with at least 1,500 Russian soldiers stationed there, in case Moldovans tried to move too far away from its orbit.
But the war led to the closure of the Transnistria–Ukraine border. In early 2024, Moldova forced separatist authorities to pay taxes if they wished to export to Europe. Almost a year later, Russia was no longer able to send free gas, and the EU had to cover the supply during the harsh winter of 2024–25. Transnistria is weakening, and with it, the Kremlin’s leverage. Although Sandu’s party unsurprisingly lost in the separatist region, PAS support there doubled between 2021 and 2025—from 15% to 30%. Today, territorial reintegration seems only a matter of time.
With Russia lacking commercial or military leverage, the debate in Moldova would seem to be settled. Yet it isn’t. The post-2022 scenario brought sharp price increases, both from the end of Russian gas supplies and the arrival of no fewer than 135,000 Ukrainian refugees. Recession has been felt in recent years, particularly in rural areas, where PAS is weaker and the socialist-communist coalition has traditionally dominated. This is why the European Commission has promised €1.9 billion in financial aid for infrastructure and economic development.
Sandu has announced her ambition for Moldova to join the EU by 2030. The accession process is slow and tedious, laden with political and trade regulations, but PAS has enough power and support to prevent potential internal tensions from halting progress. Of course, this scenario could change: the difficult economic situation may persist, urban support could wane, and the already fragile backing from the agricultural sector could vanish. While it is true that Russia has more pressing priorities today, one cannot rule out the possibility that it might attempt to exploit such a scenario.
But for now, these are just speculations. Today, with a strong and consolidated pro-Western government, the main obstacle to Moldova’s European future is neither internal nor Russia—it is the EU itself. Last year’s European Parliament elections showed the rise of nationalist and Eurosceptic parties, such as Alternative for Germany and Austria’s Freedom Party, which would not support the admission of countries in dire need. The EU cannot afford to bring in a member requiring indefinite support, especially when Ukraine’s situation demands urgent and extensive assistance. On the other hand, admitting Moldova (or Ukraine) would mean higher costs, yes, but also greater stability and security for the continent.
The last five elections have shown that Moldova has already chosen Europe. Now it is Europe’s turn to prove that it chooses Moldova.
