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The war in the Middle East against the regime of the ayatollahs does not appear to be subsiding, and Iran’s continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz threatens to trigger significant financial and economic disruption worldwide, despite US threats aimed at forcing its reopening. Around 20% of global oil exports pass through this strategic route, and maritime trade routes have had to be altered. Major markets such as China and India depend on these exports. The increase in these costs will impact the pricing of many other goods and services, as in recent days the price of crude oil has risen suddenly by more than 40% from its original value, exceeding $100 per barrel. This inevitably leads to higher inflation, a major concern for national economies already weakened by previous economic turbulence, particularly in African countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, and Tunisia. It also increases the burden of external debt denominated in dollars in heavily indebted countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia.
Another consequence, from a security perspective, is the possibility that Tehran may encourage terrorism and promote attacks against targets of its enemies in different parts of the world, including Africa, which already suffers significantly from jihadism in certain regions. For example, an escalation of the war could strengthen ties between the theocracy and Islamist cells such as the Somali group Al-Shabaab, which has been fighting for control of the country for fifteen years against a relatively weak government, despite international backing.
Looking at the Horn of Africa, close to the conflict zone shaking the world, the region has long been a site of competition between external actors, particularly in recent years involving the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. The area is strategically important as a key transit route via the Red Sea connecting Europe with Asian markets.
Iran maintains a policy of engagement with several African countries, and it remains to be seen whether the current conflict will undermine this policy and weaken its external alliances in multiple conflict zones. Recently, Washington designated a faction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan as a terrorist organisation. Sudan itself has been engulfed in a brutal civil war for nearly three years, with both sides maintaining alliances with external powers. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), for instance, receive significant (and controversial) backing from the United Arab Emirates, as well as Israeli support, while the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the official transitional government are supported by Egypt and Turkey.
Meanwhile, Israel, one of the main actors in the current war, recognised Somaliland at the end of December, a territory not internationally recognised as a state. Since then, Somalia has strengthened cooperation with Ankara out of fear of destabilisation in Mogadishu, alongside closer ties between Egypt and Somalia. In a turbulent Horn of Africa, Ethiopia remains in dispute over the use of Nile waters, which has put it at odds with Egypt and Sudan following the construction of a major dam. Somalia supports Khartoum, as do Middle Eastern actors such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt.
Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have reignited following a devastating two-year civil war (2020–2022), in which the regime in Asmara was involved. If instability increases, Tehran could align itself with Addis Ababa in the event of a renewed bilateral conflict similar to that of 1998–2000, especially considering that both countries are now members of BRICS and that Ethiopia is seeking strategic access to the Red Sea. It is also possible that Iran’s current war could reshape these alliances or, conversely, result in a complete neglect of its strategy in the Horn of Africa and in other arenas such as Yemen, where Iran supports Houthi rebels.
Most serious of all is Sudan, which for three years has been the site of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, combining civil war and genocide. It is estimated that at least 13 million people have been displaced since April 2023, and according to some sources, civilian deaths may exceed 150,000. At least half of the population, nearly 50 million people, suffers from alarming levels of hunger, leaving the country devastated while the two factions continue to fight for control of strategic cities. Negotiations have repeatedly failed, and there is no real interest from either side in achieving peace, especially in such a volatile context as that which has unfolded since early March.
A somewhat similar diplomatic situation can be observed in the conflict in the northeast of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Despite peace negotiations in Washington, mutual accusations persist between the governments of Rwanda and the DRC, with Rwanda accused of supporting the M23 militia, which exploits the country’s vast resources for the benefit of Kigali. This conflict has lasted more than a quarter of a century and has caused at least five million deaths, the highest toll since the end of the Second World War, in a country that is extraordinarily rich yet deeply vulnerable and largely ignored by the world.
The same question posed regarding the Horn of Africa must also be asked about the Sahel region. Like Somalia, several countries there, particularly in West Africa, suffer from jihadist violence. The wave of coups since 2020 has marked a setback for France, the dominant neocolonial power, while strengthening the presence of other actors such as Russia, China, and Turkey. Among the military juntas that have taken power, Turkey has become the main supplier of military drones, competing with Iran, which has strengthened ties particularly with Niger due to its uranium resources, amid Western concerns over Tehran’s potential development of a military nuclear programme.
Again, it remains to be seen whether Iran’s war will result in reduced attention to the Sahel and a resurgence of jihadist violence in these countries and neighbouring ones such as Nigeria, which has long been affected by Boko Haram and its Islamic State-affiliated splinter group. Another critical hotspot for Islamist terrorism is northern Mozambique and also the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where, among more than one hundred armed rebel groups, one particularly active and powerful faction is allied with the Islamic State.
Finally, in this catalogue of tragedies and disasters, which could be extended further, South Sudan must be included. The world’s youngest country, approaching fifteen years of existence, faces a very difficult present and is currently unable to hold normal elections. Although the civil war officially ended in 2018 after nearly five years, factional violence has increased over the past year between government forces and various dissident armed groups, raising once again the spectre of war crimes. For example, a massacre of civilians carried out by a militia resulted in 139 deaths on 1 March, and the army was responsible for another, smaller-scale massacre in the same week.
To complete this grim picture, the South Sudanese government has, for security reasons, demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations mission and other humanitarian organisations, fearing a potential army offensive against opposition forces, despite the mass displacement of civilians in Akobo, Jonglei State. The UN mission has resisted this request, stating that its personnel remain in order to assist civilians who have not fled and who are left unprotected in the face of escalating violence and its resulting trauma.
