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The Human Rights Council, created in 2006, is the main intergovernmental body of the United Nations responsible for human rights. The Council discusses thematic issues, responds to urgent situations, and by adopting resolutions and decisions, it contributes to the strengthening and continuous development of international human rights standards. Among its key accountability mechanisms is the peer review of all UN member states —the Universal Periodic Review (UPR)— and it further promotes human rights scrutiny by establishing Special Procedures, independent experts who study and issue opinions on topics or country-specific situations, as well as commissions or fact-finding missions on crimes against humanity.
As a political body, however, the Council’s success depends on the commitment of its members, and it is not immune to the political maneuvering of diplomacy. It is often criticized for vote-trading, clean-slate elections, the presence of states with poor human rights records, and for not addressing all situations of violations with equal determination.
At the same time, several authoritarian states have realized that the best way to work against the Council’s accountability and scrutiny mechanisms is through active participation, influencing debates and narratives, and thus gradually undermining international human rights norms. For example, this is the strategy of the so-called “Group of Friends in Defense of the UN Charter,” which includes, among others, Belarus, China, North Korea, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Nicaragua, Russia, Syria, and Venezuela. These dictatorships argue —under the banner of “dialogue and cooperation”— that the UN human rights system should never interfere with or criticize a state’s domestic situation without its consent, regardless of the severity of the violations.
In this sense, abandoning the Human Rights Council and disengaging from international human rights defense as a way to express criticism of the system’s imperfections is counterproductive. It leaves the playing field wide open for those very actors to impose their narratives and shield themselves from international criticism.
Yet this is precisely the policy of the Trump administration in the United States, which not only defunded and withdrew from the Council but may also fail to participate in its own UPR, scheduled for the Council’s upcoming session in October and November —a precedent that would be unprecedented and deeply concerning.
Argentina, under President Milei, has gradually abandoned the country’s longstanding policy of constructive participation in the Council in recent months. Whereas previously it issued recommendations in the UPRs of all UN member states, even when not serving as a Council member, in 2025 Argentina repeatedly remained silent, even in cases involving states with grave human rights records. This trend has now been consolidated with the withdrawal of Argentina’s candidacy for the 2026 Council, despite the fact that the bid had already been prepared over four years and more than 170 pledges of support from the UN’s 193 member states had been secured.
Although pro-government media presented this decision as a measure to protect national sovereignty, such arguments not only undermine the legitimacy of the Council but also appear to be a weak attempt to conceal the true aim of evading scrutiny and accountability. Moreover, this contradicts the very statement of the Foreign Ministry’s human rights policy, which affirms that “Argentina does not accept sovereignty or development considerations as a justification for states to deny the full realization of internationally recognized human rights,” and that “States have the responsibility to promote respect for human rights in line with the international obligations they have voluntarily accepted.”
Against this backdrop, the upcoming Council elections —to be held on October 14— warrant close attention. Fourteen seats, roughly one-third of the Council’s 47 members, will be renewed. Members are elected by majority vote of the UN General Assembly, with seats distributed equally among regional groups. For the Latin American and Caribbean group (GRULAC), Chile will seek re-election, and Ecuador has stepped in as a candidate in Argentina’s place for the second regional seat.
On September 4, the NGOs International Service for Human Rights (ISHR) and Amnesty International held their annual pledging event for candidate states. At this event, candidates are invited to present their visions and proposals for their three-year term on the Council and to answer questions from civil society. However, not all states accept or respond to this invitation, which often foreshadows the degree of their commitment to constructive cooperation with the Council and its mechanisms.
In fact, the five states that did not participate in the ISHR event were also those that met the fewest benchmarks (less than 30%) in ISHR’s comparative scorecard on candidate engagement with the UN human rights system. These ISHR scorecards reflect both states’ policies and practices regarding support for UN human rights bodies and mechanisms and their cooperation with them, as well as the implementation of obligations at the national level and their relationship with civil society. Tunisia, India, Vietnam, Egypt, and Iraq thus revealed their lack of willingness by abstaining from the event; the last three are also classified as “not free” by Freedom House.
Unfortunately, this lack of commitment does not reduce their chances of being elected, since in this election cycle the number of candidates equals the number of vacancies, thus eliminating real competition and reducing the vote to a mere formality. As Pooja Patel (ISHR) aptly stated: “Non-competitive slates undermine the purpose of elections, which is to enable member states to choose the most qualified candidates over others.”
On the positive side, half of the 14 candidates are considered “free” by Freedom House, which assesses political rights and civil liberties worldwide. Assuming all candidates are elected in October, the 2026 Council will be composed of 45% “free” states, compared to 19% “not free” and 36% “partly free,” according to Freedom House’s categories. In comparison with the 2025 composition (43% free, 36% partly free, 21% not free), this marks a slight increase in the share of states where political rights and civil liberties are generally respected, maintaining the possibility for majorities willing to defend human rights and resist attempts to undermine the universal system.
The difficult global context regarding cooperation, peace, and democratic values was highlighted repeatedly during the ISHR event. The number of the world’s democracies is declining and the commitment to universal human rights is in retreat. In the end, a political body such as the Human Rights Council cannot act more principled than its members. Therefore, if even states classified as “free” —such as Argentina and the United States— adopt foreign policies that disregard human rights, international policy in this field will continue to deteriorate.
This is why it is all the more crucial that committed defenders —both governments and civil society organizations— actively safeguard the mechanisms and achievements attained. Imperfect as they may be, they remain a vital tool to attract needed international attention to human rights claims and pressure those responsible for human rights violations.
